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Abstract: Social-psychological models of voting behavior systematically downsize the 
relevance of party leader evaluations by conceiving them as mere consequences of 
causally prior partisan attachments. However, the validity of this interpretation 
depends heavily on the effectively exogenous status of party identification. Empirical 
research shows that the assumed exogeneity of partisanship is, at best, doubtful. In such 
context, single-equation models of voting are likely to provide seriously biased 
estimates. By employing the proper econometric procedures (instrumental variable 
estimation) and the most appropriate data sources to address causality issues (panel 
data) this study provides strong support in favor of the personalization hypothesis. 
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Introduction 
In the recent decades, political parties have undergone deep transformations that are at 
once cause and consequence of the personalization of politics (McAllister, 2007; Garzia, 
2011) in established parliamentary democracies. The decline of cleavage-based voting 
(Franklin, Mackie, and Valen, 1992) forced class-mass parties to reshape their electoral 
appeal in order to extend the electoral support beyond the segment of voters to which 
they usually referred (Mair, Muller, and Plasser, 2004). This process of transformation 
into catch-all parties implies the declining role of ideology at the expense of features 
more appealing to the voters, such as the personality of the party leaders (Farrell and 
Webb, 2000). Additionally, the growth of television as major source of political 
information for a wide majority of Western electorates has further reinforced the 
political weight of individual politicians at the expense of their own parties (Mughan, 
2000). 
One of the most crucial consequences of personalization lies – or at least, should 
lie –  in the increasing centrality of leaders’ personality in the individual voting calculus. 
A widespread interpretation of contemporary voters’ behavior is that they ‘tend 
increasingly to vote for a person and no longer for a party or a platform’ (Manin, 1997, 
p. 219). Others go even further, contending that ‘election outcomes are now, more than 
at any time in the past, determined by voters’ assessments of party leaders’ (Hayes and 
McAllister, 1997, p. 3). However, the common wisdom that sees popular party leaders 
as a fundamental electoral asset for their own parties has been fiercely contested by 
comparative electoral research (King, 2002; Curtice and Holmberg, 2005; Karvonen, 
2010; Holmberg and Oscarsson, 2011). As a common denominator, the present 
literature rests on the classic social-psychological framework set forth in The American 
Voter, in which short-term influences on voting behavior are themselves subject to 
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explanation in terms of temporally and causally prior forces (Campbell et al., 1960, pp. 
24-37; Thomassen, 2005, pp. 7-17). In such framework, leader evaluations stand as a 
sort of residual category, as they appear ‘strongly mediated by such situational factors 
as the strength as well as the direction of partisan affiliation’ (Brettschneider and 
Gabriel, 2002, p. 153). 
 The enduring validity of such an interpretation of voters’ behavior rests on the 
strong assumption that party identification is relatively fixed and immune from short-
term forces. However, a variety of empirical works has shown that the assumed 
exogeneity of partisanship is, at best, doubtful (for a review, see: Marks, 1993). Voters 
might well like a party leader just because he is the leader of the party with which they 
identify. Yet the reverse might be true as well – voters could declare themselves 
partisans simply because of the appeal of the party’s leader (Curtice and Holmberg, 
2005, p. 239; Garzia, 2012). If the latter was the case, then trying to estimate the 
magnitude of leadership effects by controlling for party identification ‘would understate 
the final impact of leaders’ images by misattributing to party identification […] a portion 
of leadership’s direct effects’ (Dinas, 2008, p. 508). 
 In this paper, I take up the task of reassessing the magnitude of leader effects in 
parliamentary elections. I do so by employing the necessary econometric procedures 
(i.e., instrumental variable estimation) to overcome the problem of reciprocal causation 
between voters’ feelings of partisanship and their evaluation of party leaders. The 
following section reviews the relevant literature on leader effects and highlights its 
main weaknesses under a methodological point of view. Next, empirical measures are 
presented. The statistical analysis is performed using the data source that is best suited 
to address causality issues: panel data. For illustrative purposes, the analysis is 
performed on timely national election study data from three established parliamentary 
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democracies in Western Europe: Britain, Germany, and Italy. The results are discussed 
in the concluding section, along with their foremost implications for the study of leader 
effects in democratic elections. 
 
Party identification and leader evaluations: An endogenous relationship 
In the classic Michigan model, vote choices are conceived as a function of ‘the 
cumulative consequences of temporally ordered sets of factors’ (Miller and Shanks, 
1996, p. 192). At the heart of this model lies the notion of party identification – a long-
term affective orientation to a political party, which is rooted in early socialization and 
based on an objective location in the social structure (Campbell et al., 1960). Due to its 
social-psychological nature, party identification is conceived as an unmoved mover: that 
is, a pre-political attitude that is nonetheless able to shape the individuals’ political 
world-view in a way that accords with their partisan orientation (Johnston, 2006).  On 
these bases, partisanship is thought to be cause (but not consequence) of less stable 
attitudes and opinions about issues and candidates.  
The exogenous status of party identification, however, is far from being 
uncontested (Holmberg, 2007). In their seminal contribution, Page and Jones (1979) 
demonstrate that party  loyalties  ‘do  not  function  purely  as  fixed  determinants  of  
the  vote;  those  loyalties  can  themselves  be  affected  by  attitudes  toward  the 
current  candidates.  Even short  of  major realignments,  party  affiliations  are  effects  
as  well  as causes in  the electoral  process’ (Page and Jones, 1979, p. 1088). Regrettably, 
only a few analyses of leader effects have taken this conclusion into account. Some of 
them limit to recognize the problem of endogeneity (Crewe and King, 1994; Evans and 
Andersen, 2005; Dinas, 2008), while in only a bunch of cases the two-way causal link 
between party identification and leader/candidate evaluations is addressed empirically 
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(Archer, 1987; Marks, 1993). It is an unfortunate occurrence, as without this 
specification ‘the effects of partisanship on the vote are likely to be  exaggerated’ 
(Marks, 1993, p. 143), with leader effects substantially downsized as a result.  
Indeed, virtually all the available comparative evidence of leader effects on the 
vote points to the key role played by party identification in orienting voters’ short-term 
attitudes and vote choices in turn (see, most notably, the various chapters in: King, 
2002; Thomassen, 2005; Aarts, Blais, and Schmitt, 2011). Despite their widespread 
acceptance among political sociologists and electoral researchers, however, the 
conclusions from these studies are potentially biased in the light of the kind of data 
employed as well as the specification of the empirical model.1  
With respect to the first point, suffice it to say that virtually all the available 
evidence of party leader effects on the vote relies on cross-sectional data. However, ‘as 
long as the data are cross-sectional, any inference about structural effects must remain 
weak’ (Lewis-Beck, Nadeau, and Elias, 2008, p. 85). Whereas previous scholarship on 
leader effects had to face the lack of appropriate panel data, this restriction does not 
seem to apply anymore insofar good electoral panels are nowadays available in 
abundance. In this paper, three such data sources will be employed for illustrative 
purposes: the British Election Study 2009-2010, the German Longitudinal Election Study 
2009, and the Italian National Election Study 2006.2  
With regard to the specification of the voting model, previous scholars’ choice to 
control for party identification (in spite of its endogenous status) rests on the idea that 
‘on the one hand, if the party…factor is not controlled for, party leader effects will be 
seriously overestimated. On the other hand, if we control for the party variable, leader 
effects might be somewhat underestimated’ (Holmberg and Oscarsson, 2011, p. 37). In 
the attempt to estimate as accurately as possible the relative effect of parties and 
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leaders on the vote, our reassessment acknowledges the need to control for the party 
factor within the voting model (otherwise, leader effects might be seriously 
overestimated). In doing so, however, remedial actions must be undertaken in order not 
to underestimate the actual effect of leaders. The link of reciprocal causation between 
partisanship and leader evaluations has to be taken into account, as in such context 
these covariates become effectively endogenous and their estimated effects potentially 
biased. To overcome this problem, it is necessary to properly exogenize the offending 
variable (i.e., partisanship) through the construction of an instrumental variable in a 
two-stage process. If partisanship is correctly exogenized (that is, purified by the 
influence of leader evaluations) then it can be safely included in a model of voting 
without the risk of unjustifiably downsizing the electoral effect of leader evaluations. 
 
Empirical measures 
The dependent variable is respondents’ vote choice, measured in the post-election wave 
of the surveys and coded as in Table 1. The main covariates included in the analysis are 
respondents’ partisanship (PID) and party leaders’ evaluation (LEAD). In turn, PID takes 
the values of ‘-1’ for identifiers with the main leftist party in each country, ‘1’ for 
identifiers with the main rightist party, and ‘0’ for apartisans as well as minor parties’ 
identifiers. LEAD is a synoptic evaluation of the main two parties' leaders based on the 
standard thermometer score, recoded on a scale ranging from ‘-1’ (best score to left 
party's leader and worst score to right party's leader) to ‘1’ (best score to right party's 
leader and worst score to left party's leader). Note that all variables are coded on the 
same metric, so as to allow direct comparisons of the estimates. 
 
<Table 1 about here> 
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Preliminary analysis 
To begin with, I estimate a structurally simple cross-sectional model (i.e., all variables 
measured in the post-election survey) where vote choice is modeled as a function of 
partisanship and leader evaluations alone.  Other relevant predictors of voting behavior 
(e.g., ideology, issue proximity, economic evaluations) are deliberately excluded from 
the present specification. In fact, empirical evidence shows that the exclusion of these 
covariates would advantage the magnitude of the partisanship coefficient – as this is 
generally expected to be more collinear with ideology, issues, and the economy as 
compared to leader evaluations (Lewis-Beck, Nadeau, and Elias, 2008). This simpler 
model, then, offers a tougher test of the personalization hypothesis, as it provides a 
rather conservative estimate of the electoral impact of leader evaluations vis-à-vis 
partisanship. Because vote choice has been operationalized as a nominal dependent 
variable, a discrete choice modeling technique such as multinomial logit is preferred to 
linear regression. Vote for the main leftist party stands thus as the reference category. 
For the sake of clarity, only the contrast between vote for the main rightist party and the 
reference category is shown. The various models’ estimates (one model per country) 
are presented in Table 2.  
 
<Table 2 about here> 
 
All coefficients are highly significant (p < .001) and signed as expected, and the overall 
fit of the models is satisfactory. These results would seem to vindicate the conventional 
wisdom of electoral research, in the sense that parties dominate over leaders in each 
and every case (albeit only slightly in the British case). However, we cannot uncritically 
accept these results, for as far as both the dependent variable and the main covariates 
8 
 
are measured at the same point in time (i.e., after the election has taken place) the 
causal dynamics underlying their mutual relationship remain unclear.  
In order to tackle this issue, I estimated a dynamic model that takes full 
advantage of the panel structure of the data. As in the previous model, the dependent 
variable is measured in the post-election wave of the survey, whereas the main 
covariates are now measured in the pre-election wave. This operational choice assures 
that the independent variables meet the important causal criterion of occurring prior in 
time. Estimation takes place once again through multinomial logistic regression. The 
results are presented in Table 3. 
 
<Table 3 about here> 
 
Estimates from the dynamic model highlight a more balanced contribution on behalf of 
the two predictors of interest. Admittedly, parties still dominate over leaders in the 
German case. Yet their relative effect is now tantamount in the case of Italy, whereas in 
Britain leaders would appear to have overcame parties. Overall, this analysis reveals a 
strong effect on behalf of the leader variable – an effect that appears generally stronger 
than in previous analyses. However, not even these findings can be accepted as such, 
because the model specification from which they stem is unable to control for the 
repeatedly highlighted endogeneity between predictor variables. No safe conclusion 
about their relative effect on the vote can be drawn without taking into account this 
potential source of bias. For this reason, it is necessary to resort to instrumental 
variable estimation. 
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Exogenizing partisanship: An instrumental variable approach 
In terms of econometric theory, instrumental variables allow consistent estimation 
when covariates are endogenous. The procedure employed to create an instrumental 
variable is as follows:  
 
In the first stage, the endogenous independent variable, Y, is regressed on proper 
exogenous variables, thus creating an instrumental variable Y’. In the second 
stage, this Y’ is substituted into the original equation, and reestimation takes 
place. The method “works” because the instrumental variable is effectively 
exogenous, thereby eliminating the source of the difficulty (Lewis-Beck, Nadeau, 
and Elias, 2008, p. 88). 
 
The crucial requirement for creating an instrumental variable is that the exogenous 
variables selected are effectively exogenous: they must be determined outside the 
system and not object of causal explanation in the model. In addition, each exogenous 
variable must be (i) uncorrelated with the error term in the explanatory equation, but 
(ii) correlated with the endogenous variable they are instrumenting (Kennedy, 2008, 
chapter 9). In the case of partisanship, these standards are readily obtainable with 
safely exogenous socio-economic (SES) variables. For one thing, party identification 
itself is conceived as the result of an individual’s placement within the social structure 
(Campbell et al., 1960). At the same time, recent analyses of voting behavior in 
advanced industrial democracies have shown the progressive inability of these 
indicators to account for individuals’ vote choice (see, most notably, the various country 
chapters in: Franklin, Mackie, and Valen, 1992). Moreover, this interpretation would 
seem to fit perfectly the data at hand (explained variance in a linear probability model 
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where vote is the dependent variable and all the available SES measures from our 
datasets are simultaneously included as covariates ranges between a mere 3.9% in the 
German case and a yet unsatisfactory 9.9% in the British case. Full estimation 
procedure is available in Appendix). In other words, our SES variables meet the 
necessary conditions for consistent estimation (Sovey and Green, 2010) as their effect 
on the outcome (i.e.., vote choice) is transmitted solely through the mediating variable 
(i.e., partisanship).  
Our instrumental variable for partisanship – PID’ – is thus constructed from a 
number of SES measures available in each dataset, including: age, gender, educational 
level, social class3, trade union membership, type of employment, unemployment 
status4, region of residence and religious denomination. The instruments are “good” as 
their correlation with the original partisanship variable ranges between .23 in both 
Germany and Italy and .29 in Britain – these values being substantially comparable to 
those reported by Lewis-Beck, Nadeau, and Elias (2008, p. 91) in a similar exercise. 
Substituting the original partisanship variable for our instrumental variable in the 
dynamic model yields the results presented in Table 4. 
 
<Table 4 about here> 
 
The results from the instrumental variable estimation speak clearly in favor of our 
expectations. Once the endogenous status of partisanship is taken into account, the 
effect of leader evaluations emerges more clearly. Indeed, leaders would now appear to 
dominate over parties in each and every case. If correctly exogenized, partisanship plays 
a much weaker role within voters’ electoral calculus than often assumed. 
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Robustness checks 
To test the robustness of these findings, I have carried out several stability checks. In 
particular, I replicated the instrumental variable estimation on cross-sectional data (i.e., 
all variables measured in the post-election wave of the surveys) in order to 
accommodate for the possible influence on political attitudes exerted by the campaign. 
Results remain substantially stable: if any, the relative impact of leaders appears 
stronger.5  As a further check, I performed a number of jackknife tests. To evaluate the 
stability of the instruments, I excluded one exogenous variable at a time from the 
construction of each instrument, every time re-estimating the model with the new 
instrument. The model fit remains in every instance practically unchanged, thus 
assuring that the performance of the models does not rest on the presence or absence of 
any specific exogenous variable in the construction of the instruments.  
As a final test, I estimated a slightly more complex model of voting that takes into 
account also the effect exerted by ideology (i.e., respondent’s self-placement on the left-
right scale, as measured in the pre-election wave). The inclusion of this additional 
control bears virtually no effect on the results.6 
 
Concluding remarks 
A pervasive phenomenon in contemporary democracies, the personalization of politics 
has been the subject of considerable attention by political scientists. Against the 
conventional wisdom that sees party leaders as a fundamental electoral asset for their 
parties, however, previous empirical literature have seldom recognized the importance 
of leader evaluations in the individual voting calculus. In line with traditional 
interpretations of voting behavior, earlier studies have habitually explained short-term 
forces such as party leader images in terms of the (assumed) causally prior strength of 
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party identifications. However, the validity of this interpretation of the vote depends 
heavily on the effectively exogenous status of party identification. A number of recent 
studies demonstrates that partisanship and leader evaluations are indeed tight by a link 
of reciprocal causation. In such context, single-equation models of voting are likely to 
provide seriously biased estimates. To overcome this problem, I employed a classic 
econometric remedy: instrumental variable estimation. The results show that once 
endogeneity is taken into account (and proper data sources are employed) the electoral 
effect of leader evaluations appears much stronger than often observed.  
A note of caution is in order here. Although belonging to the parliamentary 
typology, the three countries analyzed in this paper (Britain, Germany, and Italy) might 
represent a rather favorable testing ground for the personalization hypothesis as 
compared with, e.g., the Scandinavian countries (cf. Barisione, 2009). Moreover, the 
choice to limit the analysis to the two main parties in each country implies the 
possibility of amplifying to some extent the electoral effect of a party leader that is also a 
candidate to the premiership. In this sense, much more research on a wider span of 
countries and parties is in order. The modest hope of this paper is that of having 
provided an alternative (and hopefully more sound) way to look at leader effects for 
those who will answer to this call for further research. 
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Endnotes 
                                                          
1
 For a better discussion of this point, see: Garzia and De Angelis, 2011. 
 
2 These datasets have been selected on the basis of two criteria, namely design (i.e., 
pre/post-election panel survey) and timeliness (i.e., the most recent from each country 
featuring the panel design). 
 
3 Not available in the German dataset. 
 
4 In the British case, this is substituted for annual household income. 
 
5 Post/post estimation with instrumental variables:  
Britain: PID’ = 2.49; LEAD = 7.92 
Germany: PID’ = 2.32; LEAD = 5.10 
Italy: PID’ = 2.76 ; LEAD = 6.20 
 
6
 Pre/post estimation with instrumental variables, controlling for ideology: 
Britain: PID’ = 2.47; LEAD = 5.06 
Germany: PID’ = 2.27; LEAD =4.32 
Italy: PID’ = 3.32 ; LEAD =4.55 
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Table 1. Coding of the dependent variable 
( -1 ) ( 0 ) ( 1 ) 
      
Vote for Main Leftist-Party   Vote for Main Rightist-Party 
Labour (Britain) 
Vote for other parties 
Conservatives (Britain) 
SPD (Germany) 
 
Abstention 
CDU/CSU (Germany) 
Left Democrats (Italy)   Forza Italia (Italy) 
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Table 2. Cross-sectional analysis 
 
Britain Germany Italy 
PID (Post) 4.85 (.26)* 4.23 (.13)* 6.88 (.35)* 
LEAD (Post) 4.75 (.43)* 3.09 (.25)* 3.90 (.42)* 
     
 
Pseudo-R2 .70 .52 .71 
N 1457 4006 1264 
       
 Note: Multinomial logit estimates. Standard error in parentheses. * p < .001 
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Table 3. Pre/post estimation 
 
Britain Germany Italy 
PID (Pre) 3.00 (.19)* 3.67 (.12)* 3.40 (.29)* 
LEAD (Pre) 4.12 (.35)* 2.79 (.24)* 3.61 (.34)* 
  
 
 
 
Pseudo-R2 .57 .45 .47 
N 1414 3951 1210 
       
 Note: Multinomial logit estimates. Standard error in parentheses. * p < .001 
20 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4. Pre/post estimation with instrumental variables 
 
Britain Germany Italy 
PID’ (Pre) 3.70 (.49)* 2.60 (.34)* 3.88 (1.08)* 
LEAD (Pre) 6.02 (.36)* 4.67 (.22)* 5.05 (.32)* 
   
 
Corr. PID – PID’ 
 
 
.29 
 
 
.23 
 
 
.23 
 
Pseudo-R2 .46 .21 .39 
N 1137 3850 1204 
       
 Note: Multinomial logit estimates. Standard error in parentheses. * p < .001 
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APPENDIX. Socio-economic status (SES) and vote choice 
  Britain, 2010 Germany, 2009 Italy, 2006 
Socio-demographics 
    
Age .00 .00 -.00 
Gender -.01 .01 -.02 
Education -.01 -.02 -.02 
Social class       
Middle class .14* - .01 
Union member -.19** -.21** -.15** 
Unemployed - .07 .03 
Annual Income .02** - - 
Professional sector 
    
Private .15 - - 
Public .04 - - 
Type of work 
      
Manual - .05 - 
White collar - .09* - 
Civil servant - .17** - 
Farmer - .38 - 
        
Self-employed .36 .13* - 
Employee - - -.10* 
Atypical - - -.22** 
Religion 
      
Catholic -.41 .25 .33* 
Church of England -.21 - - 
Protestant - .09 - 
Other -.36 .05 .32 
No religion -.32 .02 .01 
Region       
Scotland -.16* - - 
Wales -.10 - - 
East/West - .13** - 
North-West - - .07 
North-East -   .04 
Centre - - -.18* 
        
Adjusted R-squared .099 .035 .062 
N 1193 3924 1371 
        
Note: Multiple regression estimates (OLS). Dependent variable: Vote. ** p < .01  * p < .05 
